[翻譯] Mariners Foibles - 水手碎裂 - 美國職棒

※ [本文轉錄自 MLB 看板]

作者: RollingWave (Lost in the Dark) 看板: MLB
標題: [翻譯] Mariners Foibles - 水手碎裂
時間: Tue Jun 24 21:29:26 2008


最近十分流行轟炸水手　FO 團隊... 那 USSMariner.com的老大哥Dave Cameron 怎麼能
錯過呢？ＸＤ　（好像是在Bavasi被火的前幾天寫的）

http://tinyurl.com/58mhn9


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As I write this, the Seattle Mariners have the worst record in baseball at
24-42. They stand 16 1/2 games behind the first place Angels and, worse, they
stand a staggering nine games behind the third place Texas Rangers. The team
will have to play inspired baseball for the rest of the season to just avoid
finishing in last place, and suffice it to say, this isn't how the front office
saw the 2008 season going.

在我寫此同時水手的戰績是大聯盟最差的　24-42。 他們不但是離第一名的天使有16.5場
的差距，更慘的是他們距離第三名的遊騎兵都差了九場!!!!這支球隊需要在剩下的賽程中
有神奇的力量加持才能夠不墊底。　這很明顯的不是水手FO想像中的球季。

"It's a completely demoralizing position we're in right now, based on the
completely legitimate (preseason) expectations" was the line recently offered
up by General Manager Bill Bavasi after last week's sweep at the hand of an
Angels roster missing Vladimir Guerrero and Chone Figgins in a series where
John Lackey didn't take the mound. Even with the reality of lousiness staring
them in the face, the executives in charge of compiling this roster are
unwilling to admit that this team was assembled poorly. It wasn't just a bad
move here or an underperforming player there, but a long series of poor
decisions that have led to this abysmal season. In fact, the foundations for
this failure were laid years ago. Let's look at where this disaster started.

”這是個令人完全絕望的情況，尤其是相對於我們開季前完全合理的期待”　這是GM
豬頭Ｂ　在上禮拜被缺Guerrero / Figgan 跟沒有輪到John Lackey投球的天使橫掃後的發
言。　即使面對慘烈的現實負責組合這個球隊的主管們還是不願意承認他們的球隊組成徹
底失敗。　這不是因為一兩個錯誤/不幸的決定或是ㄧ兩個球員出乎意料的低潮而造成的
球季，事實上今年的失敗再多年前就已經注定，讓我們來看看這個災難是如何開始的吧。


October 27, 2003

Coming off a 93 win season that saw the team fade down the stretch and fail to
make the playoffs, Pat Gillick resigned as GM and was replaced by Bill Bavasi,
but the basic plan for that offseason was laid before Gillick ever stepped
aside. Central to that plan was the decision to decline an offer of arbitration
to Mike Cameron, who badly wanted to stay in Seattle. Cameron was vastly
underappreciated by the organization due to his contact problems and their
failure to understand just how valuable his glove was in center field. Two weeks
later, they announced the signing of Raul Ibanez to play left field, shifting
Randy Winn to cover center in Cameron's absence. At the time, they noted the
defensive downgrade but explained that it would be more than offset by the
offensive improvement. Ibanez has hit well since returning to Seattle, but his
defense in left field can only be described as atrocious and is one of the most
glaring issues that has sunk the 2008 team to the bottom of the A.L. West. The
seeds of the Ibanez-as-LF disaster were planted on the day that the team decided
to jettison Cameron and make a conscious decision to sacrifice defense while
chasing minor offensive improvements.

10/27/2003

在球隊因為季末的崩盤而導致這隻93勝的球隊沒有進入季後賽之後，Pat Gillick因此請辭
ＧＭ而豬頭Ｂ接任，但在此時基本的計畫已經擬定了。這個計畫的核心就是不給Mike
Cameron 薪資仲裁，Ｃameron很想留在西雅圖但是球隊因為他是電風扇而不喜歡他，也同
時嚴重的低估了他的手套在中外野的重要性，兩周後他們簽下了Raul 一半椰子，並決定讓
Randy Winn 守中外野，　在此時他們有提到守備的問題但是認為打擊的進步會能擬補這個
問題，一半椰子回到西雅圖後打得很好，但是他的守備只能以恐怖來形容，而這個超爛的
守備也是今年水手核爆的原因之一。這個結果在當年球隊為了追求一點點打擊升級而放棄
了很大的守備駐的因。



January 8, 2004

The Mariners organization has long been infatuated with player personalities
and their effects on team chemistry, often making headscratching decisions
based not on on-field ability but instead on thier preconceived notions of
leadership and how the game is supposed to be played. That move is typified
in the decision to literally give Carlos Guillen to the Tigers, as the
organization had grown weary of his late-night drinking and his perceived
negative influence on Freddy Garcia. They decided that they would rather go
with Rich Aurilia as their shortstop - a guy who more fit their mold of how
players should approach the game than Guillen. Aurilia was a gigantic bust and
was released four months later, while Guillen has gone on to become one of the
American League's best infielders ever since. It was impossible to see
Guillen's breakout coming at the time, but the logic used - choosing to field a
worse baseball team in order to have better people on it - has haunted the
organization repeatedly over the years.

1/8/2004

水手球團很重視球員的人品，也因此常常做出白目的決定，放走比較有能力的球員而請來
比較有人品的球員，這類的動作代表當然是把Carlos Guillen免費送給老虎隊然後去簽下
Rich Aurilla 來打游擊，只因為他們討厭愛喝酒的Guillen，而認為好人Aurillia會因此
讓球隊比較”團結”，結果Aurilla爛到四個月後就被丟了而Guillen從那時開始是美聯最
有價值的內野手之一。當然當時不大可能看到Guillen會忽然進步，但是當時把他放走的邏
輯這些年來多次的傷害了球隊。

December 15, 2004

After a disastrous 2003 season, the organization was determined to make a big
splash and find some new offensive stars to build around, using their financial
advantage over the rest of the division to rebuild through free agency. They
coveted Carlos Delgado's left-handed power, but after a long dance with him
over contract terms, they got tired of waiting and threw $52 million at Plan B
- Richie Sexson. Heading into his age 30 season and coming off a major injury
while possessing classic old player skills, making a long term commitment to a
player with Sexson's profile looked remarkably foolish at the time, and the
concerns we raised about guaranteeing an aging Sexson big money have proven
true with time. He's simply aged very poorly and is not a major league quality
starting first baseman anymore, but the Mariners owe him $15.5 million for the
2008 season. Instead of looking at an aging veteran heading for decline and
finding a younger, cheaper alternative, the organization focused on intangibles
such as Sexson's intimidating power and ability to be an RBI man. Unwilling to
admit that they had missed the boat on how he was going to age, Mariners fans
instead got to watch his career end mercilessly during both the '07 and '08
seasons, while Sexson became the embodiment of everything wrong with this team.

在慘烈的03球季後球團決定利用他們的金錢優勢去找些火力，他們本來想追Carlos
Delgado，但是在條件許久還談不攏的情況下他們沒耐心了，因此砸了4/52 去買　Richie
Sexson. Sexson 當時要年滿30歲而且上一個球季傷痛不斷，丟錢去簽這種老人球型的打者
長約當時就看起來很危險，而我們當時對這個合約的質疑經得起時間的考驗，他老化的速
度非常的快而現在根本不是大聯盟級的先發球員了，但是水手還欠他15.5M。 在當時沒看
到一個已經開始要快速走下坡的球員而被一些虛幻的能力如他”嚇人”的砲瓦或是他是
”經過證明的打點人”迷惑的水手球團不願意承認他們的錯誤，也因此水手球迷得以觀賞
他的選手生涯在這兩年大爆炸，性兒子已經成為了這支球隊問題的象徵。


December 22, 2005

If there's one glaring flaw the front office of the Mariners has, it's a total
inability to evaluate pitching talent. They come from a bent that is entirely
seduced by results and cares nothing about the process or the context that
those results were produced in. Nowhere is this more obvious than when the
Mariners gave Jarrod Washburn a 4-year, $37.5 million deal to leave the Angels
and join their starting rotation. Washburn was coming off a 2005 season where
he posted an obviously flukey 3.20 ERA, built entirely on a house of
runner-stranding cards. His league high left-on-base percentage predictably
regressed to the mean, and he went right back to being the #5 starter that he's
been for years. Instead of being a solidifying force in the rotation, Washburn
has given the M's 445 innings with a 4.72 ERA in a terrific pitcher's park
since signing. Despite having to watch him implode in 2008, the M's are on the
hook for another $10 million in salary in 2009, and they'd be lucky to give
Washburn away at this point. Thanks to a pitching analysis based on results,
the organization continues to just wildly misunderstand how to predict future
run prevention, and this is most obvious with the Washburn contract. By the way,
the next best offer Washburn had on the table was 2 years at a total of $14
million.

12/22/2005
水手球團最糟糕的就是他們完全缺乏評估投手的能力，完全的備結果迷惑而對於過程渾然
不覺，這個最糟糕的範例就是跟Jarrod Washburn 簽下 4/37.5的合約，洗炸彈05年交出了
漂亮的3.20 ERA，但是那完全是因為對手壘上打擊嚴重便秘的好運，這個好運可想而知的
很快的就吐回來了，而他也回到了他五號先發的真面目，他不但沒有如水手預期的穩固
輪值，反而給了他們445局的4.72ERA...在一個很好的投手球場。　水手在09年還欠他10M
而現在他們大概想把洗炸彈送人都沒人要了。因為這種只看結果的主管讓水手完全沒有任
何評估投手未來成功的能力。　當時洗炸彈第二好的約只有 2/14.


January 4, 2006

Faced with a strong desire for some "left handed sock," the M's focused on a
list of low-cost, one-year options to fill the hole at Designated Hitter.
Completely ignoring the entire concept of replacement level, the M's
disregarded every player on the planet that wasn't a proven veteran with a long
track record of success, essentially ensuring they were going to get a
washed-up old timer on his last legs. That guy turned out to be Carl Everett,
and his could-see-it-coming-a-mile-away failure both doomed the offense and
led to an even more heinous transaction, when the Mariners shipped Asdrubal
Cabrera and Shin-Soo Choo to Cleveland in separate deals to acquire the DH
platoon of Ben Broussard and Eduardo Perez. Neither of the new acquisitions did
much to help an offense that was in disrepair, and the careless giving away of
talented youngsters in search of proven veterans depleted the farm system of
guys who could have helped the team down the line. When asked directly why the
team chose Everett over free talent guys such as Carlos Pena, Bavasi replied
that "we know Everett can hit 5th or 6th in the line-up, and Pena just hasn't
proven that he can do that yet". Good call, Bill.

1/4/2006

為了追求左砲，水手看了一群可以打一年工的低價選擇，然後完全排除任何缺乏長期成功
的名子，這就已經保證了他們絕對會簽到一個快玩完的老人，那個老人結果是恐龍
Everett， 而這個三歲小童都可以看出會完蛋的約造成了更多後續的傷害，在Everett不出
所料的失敗後水手分次的把Asdrubal Cabrera 跟秋信守送給了笑臉人換來DH 輪值Edurdo
Perez 跟　Ben Broussard，兩人都沒啥幫助，而水手不小心丟出的球員讓他們也因此沒有
了小聯盟的可能生力軍。　在事後被問到為何簽下了Everett而不是Carlos Pena, 豬頭Ｂ
回答”因為我們確定Everrett可以打5/6棒，Pena 沒有證明他可以”　偉哉! 豬頭Ｂ


December 7, 2006

In another transaction that was bad enough on its own and unbelievably horrible
based on the future events it led to, we have the inexplicable Rafael Soriano
for Horacio Ramirez trade. The M's were tired of Soriano's lack of durability
and believed that his elbow was a ticking time bomb, so they set out to trade
him at the winter meetings that year. They settled on a left-handed National
Leaguer with a NL fastball because "he'd won some games before" and the Braves
were willing to make him available. Ramirez was a complete disaster, giving the
Mariners 100 innings of below replacement level performance before getting
released. To replace Soriano, the Mariners then converted 2006 #1 draft pick
Brandon Morrow into a relief pitcher, believing that they needed a new power
arm to replace the one they just lost. Two years later and Morrow is still
stuck in the bullpen, losing precious development time and not being able to
be viewed as a potential option for the rotation. Because Morrow wasn't
considered starter material, the Mariners blew $48 million on tub-of-goo Carlos
Silva and then spent a first round pick on Josh Fields in the 2008 draft in
order to have a new power reliever in the organization to allow them to move
Morrow back to the rotation eventually. By trading Soriano, the M's not only
got back a horrible pitcher, but they also opened several holes on the roster
that they then spent precious valuable resources trying to fill.

12/7/2006

又是一個本身就很糟而後續的影響正是遭透的交易，水手因為不喜歡Rafael Soriano的
痛痛人傾向而決定一定要交易他，然後他們去換了國聯投手Horacio Rameriez.因為
Rameriez "曾經贏過不少次”Rameriez 完全的失敗，給了水手超過100局比replacement
level 還差很多的成績，而因為沒了Soriano水手決定他們”必須”要有一個火球RP，
因此把他們當時最好的農作物投手Brandon Morrow改RP， Morrow因此失去了寶貴的發展時
間，而又因為Morrow變成ＲＰ水手砸了4/48去買一桶肥油 Carlos Silva，然後又因為
Silva 炸了所以急著把Morrow轉回SP 然後第一回選了RP Josh Fields。 這個交易不只
造成了一個洞，而是為了補這個洞後面又開了更多洞。


December 18, 2006

Finally, the cherry on top of this amazing series of bad roster moves.
Determined to not let Everett go down as the worst designated hitter in
organizational history, the M's made the decision to fill their DH role for
2007 with a broken down middle infielder who had the power of an eight-year-old
girl. The Nationals simply wanted to move Jose Vidro, who didn't fit in a
league where defense was required, and somehow convinced the Mariners to pick
up $12 million of the remaining $18 million left on Vidro's contract. The
rationale given was that a move to DH would somehow restore the 32-year-old's
power and, besides, they really needed a #2 hitter who didn't strike out,
despite the fact that they had a team full of guys whose best skill was contact
and lacked power. Not surprisingly, Vidro's power never returned, and he's
posted a .289/.350/.376 line since coming over in the trade from Washington.
Only in Seattle would that be acceptable as a performance from a designated
hitter completely incapable of playing the field or running the bases, but
somehow, that's what the organization decided they wanted. Vidro's presence on
the roster not only kept the remains of Ibanez comically chasing fly balls in
the outfield, but it also has forced them to keep top prospect Jeff Clement
languishing in Tacoma while he destroys Pacific Coast League pitching.
Hilariously, Vidro's 2008 performance has been so terrible (.215/.260/.323)
that most fans are amazed he hasn't been released yet, but John McLaren's
lineup construction veers so far from reality that he's spent the last two
weeks alternating between the 3rd and 4th spots in the batting order. Seriously,
Vidro, he of the .583 OPS, spent several games hitting cleanup for the Mariners
recently. I wish I was kidding.

12/18/2006
最後的傑作，水手為了確保恐龍Everrett不是隊史上最糟的ＤＨ而決定去換一個完全沒瓦
的傷痛老人來當ＤＨ，那個人是Jose Vidro，國民當時只是想找任何人來拿他都可以，結
果水手還居然付了一堆錢跟農作物，他們認為打DH會讓他的砲瓦恢復，結果當然沒有，但
水手又說沒關係，反正我們本來就想要一個不會三振的高打率二棒，雖然他們幾乎整個球
隊都是這種人。只有在西雅圖Vidro的 .289/.350/.376 被接受成可以看的DH，也因為他
讓一半椰子的屍體整天還在那裏接不到飛球，而大物Jeff Clement屠殺了ＡＡＡ卻也上
不來，Ｖidro今年打的之差大部分人都很意外他還沒被丟，但是他最近卻好幾次打3/4棒，
我真希望這是個笑話。


Through it all, the Mariners front office has demonstrated a staggering lack of
ability to evaluate and project major league talent. They have repeatedly
misunderstood what makes a winning team and made brutally bad choices that are
compounded by even worse decisions trying to fix the problems created by the
first act of ignorance. Through it all, they've doggedly maintained that their
ways are effective and will work despite mountains of evidence to the contrary.
Team President Chuck Armstrong, talking about the season and the job status of
the front office on May 25th, uttered the following quotes:

水手球團證明了他們不但完全不懂球員為何會成功，而且還根據他們完全錯誤的想法持續
進行而且還在之後為了擬補前面錯誤的情況下犯了更多的錯誤。　他們在罄竹難書的證據
面前還是不願意承認錯誤，球團總理Chuck Armstrong 5/25:

"In my 23 years, I have never ever seen anything like this," Armstrong said "We
saw it the other way in 2001. I mean, you have to ask yourself, 'How did the
Mariners win 116 games that season with that roster, compared to this roster?'
This is just as inexplicable the other way."

我23年來從沒看過這種情形，我們01年好像剛好相反，你會想說01年那種組合都可以贏116
場這種組合怎麼會這樣呢？”

"Their positions are secure," Armstrong said "They are not to be blamed for
what's going on."

他們的工作安全，這不是他們的錯。

"We have given no thought to making any changes in managerial personnel,"
Armstrong said. "Same for the GM. Listen, he's part of the solution, not the
problem."

我們沒打算換人也沒打算換ＧＭ，他們是解決問題的助力不是阻力 (譯者按: HAHAHAHAHA)


What's worse than abject failure? How about rooting for an organization that
can't even recognize the problem from the solution? The Mariners executives are
so rooted in their ways, so dogmatic in their wrongheadedness, that there is
seemingly no light at the end of this long tunnel that we call being a Mariner
fan. $117 million dollars in payroll has bought them a roster on pace to lose
104 games, and through it all, they won't admit responsibility. It's
inexplicable, after all. What else is there to be said?

什麼是比失敗更糟糕呢? 支持一個連問題在哪裡都看不出來的失敗球團如何? 水手球團對
於他們完全錯誤的認知有著堅定的信仰， 讓水手迷的黑暗似乎永無光明之日，117M 的
薪資買到了目前預定要輸104場比賽的球隊， 而同時球團認為他們是對的還能說啥呢?


David Cameron, along with Derek Zumsteg, authors the ussmariner.com blog that
covers the Seattle organization in more depth than they care to admit. He also
writes daily for fangraphs.com as he looks to remember what it's like to enjoy
watching baseball again.



--
PTT 神人大大準則

1.多回少發 2.言出必酸 3.專挑語病 4.緊咬不放
5.自命清高 6.老梗重彈 7.不容異論 8.天下無敵

要是你的發言模式符合以上三點以上，恭喜妳成為PTT神人。

--